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fix: address final review (path traversal, sync races, MCP limits)
Findings from a Codex (gpt-6.1-sol, xhigh) review of v0.2.4..HEAD, each verified in the code before fixing: - high: ticker symbols reached cache file paths unchecked, so a symbol like `../../REPORT` read (and deleted, if unparseable) .json files outside the cache, reachable through MCP get_quotes. resolve_symbol now accepts only ticker characters, and cache keys are encoded as single safe path components. - high: sync decided before downloading and replaced the database without rechecking; an import that landed meanwhile was erased. It now rechecks the local state before installing, and idx-mcp runs ownership_sync exclusively with ownership reads. - replaces_sqlite_sha256 never downgrades history: the client requires the rebuild to keep at least the local release count, and the publisher lists a replaced build only then. - cache writes are atomic (temp file + rename), so concurrent readers never see, and delete, a partial entry. - idx-mcp caps symbols (20, deduplicated) and limits, and runs at most 4 tool calls at once. - each Yahoo client gets its own cookie jar, paired with its crumb. - ZIP entries (XLSX, KSEI archives) are read with a 256 MiB bound; non-ASCII archive dates and huge percentages are parse errors instead of panics or overflow. - agent-smoke --keep deletes every copied agent config, not only auth files. CLI goldens unchanged; the MCP tool golden changes only to state the new caps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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16 changed files with 310 additions and 59 deletions
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@ -8,3 +8,27 @@ pub mod search;
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pub mod snapshot;
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pub mod types;
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pub mod xlsx;
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use std::io::Read;
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use crate::error::IdxError;
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/// Largest decompressed ZIP entry read into memory. Real IDX worksheets and
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/// KSEI TXT archives are tens of MB; this bounds a hostile "zip bomb".
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const MAX_ZIP_ENTRY_BYTES: u64 = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
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/// Reads one decompressed ZIP entry as UTF-8, failing past the size limit.
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pub(crate) fn read_zip_entry_bounded(entry: impl Read, what: &str) -> Result<String, IdxError> {
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let mut bytes = Vec::new();
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entry
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.take(MAX_ZIP_ENTRY_BYTES + 1)
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.read_to_end(&mut bytes)
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.map_err(|e| IdxError::ParseError(format!("failed to read {what}: {e}")))?;
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if bytes.len() as u64 > MAX_ZIP_ENTRY_BYTES {
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return Err(IdxError::ParseError(format!(
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"{what} expands beyond {MAX_ZIP_ENTRY_BYTES} bytes"
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)));
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}
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String::from_utf8(bytes)
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.map_err(|e| IdxError::ParseError(format!("failed to decode {what}: {e}")))
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}
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